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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DOUBLE JEOP-
ARDY HELD No BAR To IMPOSITION OF HARSHER PENALTY UPON
RE-TRIAL - DUE PROCESS MANDATES CREDIT FOR TIME PREVIOUSLY
SERVED. -North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Respondent Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to commit
rape and sentenced to a term of 12 to 15 years in prison. Upon seek-
ing post-conviction relief, he was awarded a new trial at which he
was again convicted and sentenced to an 8 year prison term which,
when complemented by the time previously served, amounted to a
greater penalty than that originally imposed. Similarly, respondent
Rice pleaded guilty to four counts of second degree burglary, and was
sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 10 years for all 4 counts.
These judgments were later set aside; respondent was retried on 3 of the
original counts, convicted and sentenced to prison for a total of 25
years without compensation for time already served.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, upholding the lower courts' re-
versals of both sentences, held that while neither the double jeopardy
nor the equal protection clause imposes an absolute bar to a more
severe sentence, the constitutional guarantee against multiple punish-
ment requires that the punishment already exacted be fully credited
upon resentencing, and that the sentencing court include affirmative
findings to support their action when augmenting the original sentence.
The problems illuminated by the companion cases of North
Carolina v. Pearce1 and Simpson v. Rice2 are not of recent conception.
As early as 1873, the Court construed the double jeopardy clause to
prohibit more than one punishment for the same offense. In Ex parte
Lange3 the defendant, sentenced to a prison term and fined, had paid
the fine before discovering that state law provided for either imprison-
ment or fine. Recognizing that no man lawfully can be twice punished
for the same offense, the Court ordered the defendant's release from
prison. Similarly, in United States v. Benz,4 the defendant successfully
petitioned to have his sentence reduced from 10 months to 6. While
the issue presented involved the district court's power to decrease a
convict's sentence, the Supreme Court observed by way of strong dicta,
1395 U.S. 711 (1969).
2 Id. The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals and rendered one opinion.
3 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). The Lange Court established a defendant's immunity
from an increased sentence in the absence of a self-initiated appeal. This right, in the
Court's view, was founded upon the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
4282 US. 304 (1931).
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that an increase affecting the sentence upon a valid conviction would be
violative of the double jeopardy clause in that the defendant would be
subjected to double punishment for the same offense."
Despite such broad propositions, the Court has never squarely held
the imposition of an increased penalty upon retrial to be per se viola-
tive of the Constitution. For example, in Murphy v. Massachusetts,8
upon vacation of the original sentence, the defendant received a sen-
tence greater than that which had been set aside. On appeal, the Court,
ignoring the "chilling effects" of such a rationale upon the defendant's
right of appeal, held that as the second sentence resulted from the
defendant's own initiative, the former conviction and partial service of
sentence constituted no bar to the imposition of a greater sentence.
The Murphy rationale was invoked and implicitly reaffirmed in
Stroud v. United States,7 wherein the defendant received the death
penalty upon retrial following the successful appeal of a life sentence.
That case, however, argued on the theory that the defendant was twice
put in jeopardy for the identical offense, did not present the Court with
the question of whether risk of an increased penalty on retrial con-
stitutes a second punishment for the same offense. So distinguished,
Stroud is assertive of the proposition that a sustained attack upon an
original conviction does not, by force of the double jeopardy clause,
absolutely immunize the defendant from reprosecution.
Green v. United States8 greatly clarified the intention of the Court
in Stroud. A conviction of second degree murder was reversed on
5 Id. at 307. The defendant's sentence may not be increased once it has commenced.
To compel him to risk an increased sentence in order to exercise his right to a fair
trial is equivalent to requiring that the defendant relinquish the immunity accorded
the prior sentence in order to exercise his constitutional rights.
6 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
7251 U.S. 15 (1919). Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945), has also been
cited as supportive of the validity of increased sentences upon retrial. In Robinson, the
defendant's sentence was increased upon retrial from life imprisonment to death. The
court of appeals judgment was affirmed on certiorari without reference to the increased
sentence. Indeed, the sole question presented and resolved related to the court's statutory
authority to impose the death sentence under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 408, 414(a), 419(a)(b) (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 1201-02 (1964). Accordingly,
Robinson would be of doubtful force as authority for allowing an increase upon retrial.
8 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The Court had earlier held that a defendant, successful on
appeal, may be exposed to a sentence as severe as that previously imposed, but neither
condoned nor prohibited a more severe penalty. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 622
(1896).
A second trial after the defendant's appeal had been justified on the grounds that
the accused had "waived" his plea of former jeopardy. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163 (1873). However, in the circumstances of Green a new trial would be barred
following a successful appeal. Insofar as the first verdict was "an implicit acquittal" of
the original charge, the Court rejected arguments that Green had "waived" the constitu.
tional prohibition against double jeopardy. See generally Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari,
New Trials and Successful Prosecutions, 74 HAv. L. R1v. 1 (1960).
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appeal, and the defendant was retried, found guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court, reasoning that the
initial conviction implied acquittal of any higher degree of the same
crime, reversed, holding the second conviction violative of the double
jeopardy protection against reprosecution. Green could be reprosecuted,
but for no crime greater than second degree murder. While the issue of
reprosecution had been determined, the question of resentencing re-
mained for future resolution.
The guarantee against double jeopardy was held to impose no
restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction.
Indeed, as Stroud had previously demonstrated, it had been long estab-
lished that the courts were authorized to impose whatever sentence the
law prescribed. Marano v. United States9 was the first decision to take
issue with what had theretofore remained within the unfettered discre-
tionary power of the courts. The defendant had been sentenced to
three years in prison upon conviction in a district court for receiving
stolen goods in interstate commerce. Upon appeal, the conviction was
vacated ° and a new trial awarded at which the defendant was recon-
victed and sentenced to a five year term. The judge, who had presided
at both trials, noted, as the basis for the longer sentence, the evaluation
of the presentence report and the additional testimony produced at the
second trial." However, reversing on appeal, the First Circuit held that
the increased term was improper since the introduction of the addi-
tional testimony impinged upon the defendant's unfettered right of
appeal. 12 Manifestly, absent "substantial justification" a defendant
should not be deterred in the exercise of this right due to the danger
that this might result in the imposition of a direct penalty. Presaging
things to come, however, the court further concluded by way of dicta
that it was not inappropriate for a trial court to consider subsequent
9 374 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1967).
10 Kitchell v. United States, 354 F.2d 715 (Ist Cir. 1965). Marano was tried and
convicted along with several other defendants; all but one were successful on appeal.
11 It is not without significance that where a subsequent plea of not guilty is inter-
posed at the second trial, the state, in view of such contested facts, is compelled to
present further independent evidence of the defendant's guilt. Nevertheless, the Marano
court rejected such additional testimony as a basis of an increased sentence, despite the
settled doctrine that the state may enter new evidence against the defendant at retrial.
While such a distinction may appear overly refined, it is indeed constitutionally sound.
See United States v. Shatwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233 (1957).
2 374 F.2d at 585. Accord, Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966).
While it is generally accepted that a defendant has no constitutional right of appeal, it
has been held that where such a right has been provided, it must be neither conditioned
nor hindered by unreasoned or irrational distinctions. Indeed, access to the courts must
be equal for all convicted. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 US. 305 (1966).
[VOL. 4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
events, so long as the grounds for any increased sentence affirmatively
appear.13
The Marano dicta was amplified in Patton v. North Carolina.4
Patton, an indigent not represented by counsel, was tried and convicted
for armed robbery and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Although
he initially took no appeal, he subsequently sought post-conviction
relief and was granted a new trial on the basis of Gideon v. Wain-
wright.1 Patton, though assisted by counsel at the second trial, was
reconvicted and sentenced to 20 Years. Jn a subsequent habeas
corpus proceeding'0 the court, noting that credit had not effectively
been allowed for previous servitude, focused upon the motivation of
the trial court in imposing the harsher sentence. Stating that no facts
appeared in the record which would warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty, the court found a denial of both due process and equal
protection. In addition, since no other rational support offered a sound
basis for such a sentence, affirmation would either inhibit an indi-
vidual's right to appeal or, at best, unconstitutionally condition it. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,17 holding that the
13 374 F.2d at 583. State and federal courts have been badly divided upon the question
of whether a trial judge must articulate his reasons for increased sentence upon retrial.
Contrary to Marano, the Third Circuit in United States ex rel Starner v. Russell, 378
F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967), while endorsing the traditional waiver theory, was fearful of
undermining the role of the trial judge and restated the view that the imposition of a
greater sentence upon retrial need not be accompanied by affirmative findings supportive
of such action. Cf. United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), wherein the
Seventh Circuit, agreeing with the Starner court, found that the trial judge was not
required to disclose the particular facts relating to his decision to impose a harsher
sentence. Marano dealt with an increase in sentence imposed by a federal court. The court
held that the increase could not be founded upon additional testimony adduced at the
second trial, but revived the problem and possibly undermined the original holding by
adding, in dictum, that an increase could be validly based on the presentence report. See
also United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967); United States
v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967).
14 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 US. 905 (1967).
15 372 US. 335 (1963). Gideon enunciated that the sixth amendment, as applied to
the states through the fourteenth, requires all indigent defendants charged with a felony
be provided with court-appointed counsel to represent them at trial.
16 Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 381 F.2d 636
(4th Cir. 1967). While the defendant had failed to exercise his right of appeal, the court
of appeals nevertheless held that he had exhausted his state remedies; for it would be
"futile" to seek state appellate review in view of the law of North Carolina. 381 F.2d
at 637.
17 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). The court, noting the realities of the trial judge's
sentencing decision, held that a harsher sentence was impermissible whether it was the
result of an increase in the orignal sentence or of a denial of credit. The trial judge
had stated:
Before I announce punishment, I will take into consideration the fact that he
has served four years, or nearly five years.... I would give you five more years
1969]
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due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy all mandate a uniform rule pro-
hibiting subsequent imposition of a sentence more severe than that
rendered invalid by an appellate court. The court, rejecting the reason-
ing of Marano, i.e., that subsequent events may provide justification
for the imposition of an increased sentence, stated that in order to
prevent abuse, the fixed policy must necessarily be that the new sen-
tence shall not exceed the old.
In the companion cases of Pearce and Rice, the Supreme Court
refused to accede to the position of the Fourth Circuit. In Pearce, the
defendant was awarded a new trial by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina18 upon the ground that an involuntary confession had been
admitted in evidence against him. The sentencing judge at the second
trial imposed an eight year prison term, announcing the intention to
give Pearce a fifteen year sentence but taking into consideration the
time already served. Although the new sentence combined with the
time already served exceeded that originally imposed, it was affirmed
by the highest state court.19 Pearce then instituted a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in which the district court, relying upon Patton, held the longer
sentence unconstitutional and void, and upon the state court's failure to
resentence Pearce, ordered his release. The Fourth Circuit, in a brief
per curiam opinion, 20 affirmed on the basis of Patton. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a sentencing court must give
effective credit to a reconvicted defendant for time already spent in
prison. Invoking the proposition that no man lawfully can be punished
twice for the same offense, the Court noted that the constitutional
prohibition against multiple prosecution also forbade multiple punish-
ment for the same offense. Such multiple punishment is clearly demon-
strated when a maximum sentence for an offense is imposed upon re-
trial without compensation for time previously served.
As to Rice, despite an obvious reluctance to drastically alter the
current state of the law, the decision was deeper and infinitely broader.
Rice had served 2;/2 years of an original 10 year sentence when his
conviction was set aside in a state coram nobis proceeding on the ground
than what I am giving you, but I am allowing you credit for the time that you
have served. Judgment ... is that the Defendant be imprisoned ... for a term of
twenty years..
Id. at 637 n.1.
18 266 N.C. 284, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
19 State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966). The North Carolina Supreme
Court had acknowledged that the evidence at the second trial was essentially identical to
the evidence presented at the original trial.
20 897 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1968).
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that he had not been accorded his constitutional right to counsel. Upon
reconviction, he was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years, with no
consideration given for previous imprisonment. In a subsequent habeas
corpus proceeding, Rice alleged that the state trial court had acted
unconstitutionally in failing to credit him with time previously served,
and in imposing a harsher sentence upon retrial. Agreeing with both
contentions, the district court held that insofar as the petitioner had
been punished for exercising his postconviction right of review, he had
been denied due process of law.
The Supreme Court, in an obvious effort to preserve the trial
court's power to impose a lawful sentence, affirmed, but did not agree
that a more severe sentence on retrial constituted a per se violation of
the due process clause. While the Court recognized the inequities of a
"dean slate" in relation to imprisonment prior to retrial, it concluded
that insofar as the conviction itself is concerned, the slate actually had
been wiped dean. The conviction had been invalidated and the re-
mainder of that sentence would not be served. However, since re-
prosecution is not prohibited in such instances, the Court believed that
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy did not place
any restriction upon the imposition of a lawful single punishment for
the offense committed. In addition, the Court, expressing its fear that a
different holding would cast doubt upon the right of reprosecution
enunciated in United States v. Ball,21 refused to risk such a disturbance
of settled doctrine.22
The theory that the equal protection clause prohibits the imposi-
tion of a more severe sentence, since only that class of convicts who
successfully obtain vacation of their original sentence are exposed to
the risk of harsher penalty, was likewise rejected by the Court. Instead,
it reasoned that the problem was not one of lengthened terms imposed
only upon those who are retried, but involved merely longer new sen-
tences arising from new trials. Since each defendant could be acquitted,
or if convicted, receive a sentence shorter, equal to or longer than that
which had been vacated, the Court disagreed that this amounted to a
malignant classification of those successful upon review. Thus, where
the opportunity for acquittal or lesser sentence upon reconviction is
afforded the successful appellant, no equal protection problem exists.
Rejecting the double jeopardy and equal protection arguments, the
21 163 US. 662 (1896). For a brief discussion and analysis of Ball see note 8 supra.
22 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US. 711, 714-15 (1969). For a detailed discussion of
the "void sentence" and "waiver" doctrines and their effect on reprosecution, see Whalen,
Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MDNN.
L. R v. 239, 240-44 (1951).
1969]
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Court recognized that due process of law would be offended if a state
court adopted a rigid policy of levying more stringent penalties upon
the reconviction of each defendant who had been successful in obtain-
ing a reversal of his original conviction. Clearly, the objective of such a
practice would be to discourage attacks upon unlawful convictions,
thus "penalizing those who choose to exercise constitutional rights." 23
The "chilling effect" upon those who might otherwise choose to exercise
their constitutional rights is evident.24 No court may levy a price on an
appeal; this right must be preserved, free and unconditioned.25 Thus,
in order to prevent vindictiveness and to eliminate the fear of retalia-
tion, Pearce mandates that where a more severe sentence is imposed on
retrial, the trial court's reasons for such action must affirmatively appear
to be
based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the
original sentencing proceeding.26
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a brief concurrence arguing that a defendant
who risks the maximum punishment during his first trial need not be
confronted by that risk a second time, viewed the double jeopardy
clause as an effective bar to the imposition of a harsher sentence upon
retrial. He rejected the contention that events subsequent to the first
trial might justify an increased penalty, noting that such justification
may be present in any case, not merely in those instances in which a
defendant has successfully appealed his conviction. Simply stated, since
the state cannot increase the sentences of those who do not appeal, it
should not be permitted to subject those who do appeal to the risk of
such augmentation.27
23 395 U.S. at 724, quoting United States v. Jackson, 290 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). For a
compilation of data demonstrating the high incidence of harsher penalties upon reconvic-
tion, see Note, Constitutional Law: Increased Sentences and Denial of Credit Upon Re-
trial Sustained Under The Traditional Waiver Theory, 1965 DuKE L.J. 395.
24 For a complete discussion of the possible due process violations present in these
cases, see Brief for ACLU and North Carolina CLU as Amid Curiae at 16, North Carolina
v. Pearce, 895 U.S. 711 (1969).
25 The price of exposure to a harsher penalty may be more than a defendant would
be willing to pay in the assertion of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The presence
of such a risk would seem to have a restraining effect upon those who would otherwise
attempt to vindicate suppressed rights. See generally Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). See
also Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 595 (1960).
26 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US. 711, 726 (1969).
27 Id. at 731-32 (concurring opinion by Douglas, J.). Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring
and dissenting in part, adopted a similar position. Scrutinizing the situation, he found
that the defendants were confronted with a "desperate choice" as to whether or not to
appeal. He thus contended that the increased sentences upon retrial effectively penalized




The holding in these cases demonstrates a continued reluctance on
the part of the Supreme Court to interfere with state criminal proce-
dure,28 absent a dearly delineated and flagrant violation of constitu-
tional protections. Here, the due process violations and opportunities
for abuse of a defendant's rights are patently obvious; yet the Court
remains quite restrained in formulating standards to which states would
be obliged to adhere.29 The decision rests upon the firm belief that
judicial discretion in the sentencing process must not be overly re-
stricted.8 0 Underlying this view is the rationale that the sentencing
process is not directly related to the substantive issue of guilt,31 and
accordingly, should not be made the object of uniform standards.
Indeed, each particular case, with its concomitant sentence, is deter-
mined by a proliferation of variable factors which may not be amenable
to measurement according to a fixed scale. 32
The equal protection argument was cogently discussed in Patton v. North Carolina,
381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), wherein the court concluded that the threat of a more
severe sentence falls only upon those exercising the post-conviction procedures provided
by the state.
If the State wishes to institute a system permitting upward revision of sentences
... it may not discriminate in this regard against those who have availed them-
selves of the right to a fair trial. This is an arbitrary classification, offensive to the
equal protection clause.
Id. at 642. See also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 186 (1957). "The law should
not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible dilemma."
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
28 See generally Comment, Federal Intrusions in State Criminal Proceedings-New
Approaches in The Abstention Doctrine, 3 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 450 (1969).
29Id. at 455. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the
defendants were continually subjected to prosecutions by local and state authorities. The
Court recognized that although the petitioners might eventually prevail in the state courts,
the ability of the authorities to continue utilizing a given statute, in bad faith, for the
purpose of harassment would not be impeded. Id. at 490. Pearce is analogous to Dombrow-
ski in that the possibility of a greater sentence may inhibit a defendant's assertion of his
right to a fair trial in the same manner that the authorities in Dombrowski might have
exerted a "chilling effect" on the assertion of first amendment rights.
30 The Court clted the principle, approved in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949), that the judge, as an extension of the state, may adopt the philosophy of penology
which holds that punishment should be determined by the offender and not merely by
the crime. It is contended that the judge is in the most advantageous position to deter-
mine, on the basis of testimony, presentence and other reports, what punishment would
most properly be imposed upon the defendant involved. Thus, as long as the defendant's
constitutional rights are not violated, the sentencing judge should be free to choose the
most appropriate punishment from among those prescribed, and any restrictions placed
upon his power to impose penalties should further the desired result so as to override
the interest of society in levying the most effective sanctions. For a detailed discussion of
the role of discretion in sentencing, see Vasoli, Growth and Consequences of Judicial
Discretion in Sentencing, 40 NoTE DAME LAw. 404 (1965).
31 An example of this doctrine is the distinction between treatment of a first offender
and a recidivist convicted of the same offense. See generally Institute on Sentencing, 42
F.R.D. 175 (1967). See also Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction -
A Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MoNT. L. Ray. 1 (1963).
32 Since each state possesses the power to formulate a penal code reflecting the
1969]
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The Court rejected both the equal protection and double jeopardy
arguments which were advanced, in the first instance merely dismissing
the idea of discrimination by a state against a given class of convicts,
and finally, by viewing the second sentence not as an increased original
sentence, but rather as a completely separate identity, incidentally
greater than that originally imposed. The theory that a defendant may
receive anything from acquittal to a longer term upon retrial appar-
ently satisfied the Court that no discrimination exists, but will hardly
answer the question for that segment of defendants confronted with a
longer sentence upon reconviction.33 The double jeopardy provision
was found not preclusive of a more severe penalty, since it has been
established that the state has and must retain the right to reprosecute a
defendant whose initial conviction has been vacated upon appeal, while
preserving the power to impose upon him that penalty which may be
considered most beneficial.34 Indeed, the state may subjectively pre-
scribe "punishment which fits the offender and not merely the crime."35
In doing this, the trial court may consider evidence adduced at the
second trial itself, or the defendant's prison record under the vacated
sentence. 6 In essence, then, although the double jeopardy guarantee
protects the defendant from being found guilty of a graver offense, he
philosophy of penology prevalent within its jurisdiction, there exists a multiplicity of
sentencing practices which gives effect to the various theories upon which punishment
may be founded. The rehabilitation theory and the retribution-deterrent theory seem to
be the poles between which most sentencing philosophies gravitate. One can contend, how-
ever, that whatever the basic philosophy of a jurisdiction, all differences in sentences
should be based upon factors which rationally justify the distinctions in results. All
convicts should be treated equally before the law, and sentences should reflect equality
of imposition as well as the relevant circumstances of each case. For a general discussion of
the various theories of sentencing and the concomitant problems of parole systems see
George, Sentencing Methods and Techniques in the United States, 26 FED. PROB., 33-40
(1962); Spitzer, Punishment Versus Treatment?, 25 FE. PRoB. 3-7 (1961); Wechsler, The
Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097 (1952).
33 395 US. at 725 n.20, quoting evidence reflecting such a fear which had been noted
by the trial judge in Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
34 The freedom of a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's conduct subse-
quent to the first conviction in imposing a new sentence is no more than consonant
with the principle, fully approved in Williams v. New York, . . . [337 U.S. 241
(1949)], that a State may adopt the "prevalent modern philosophy of penology
that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime."
395 U.S. at 723. The Court, in effect, reiterates the doctrine that states are free to choose
their own goals and procedures for sentencing, without tempering the discretionary power
of the judge. The only qualification which the Court would seem to impose upon this
discretion would be that the absence of retaliatory motivation be assured, at least as re-
flected in the sentence. Accordingly, a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after
retrial must make clear his reasons for doing so. 395 U.S. at 726.
35 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
35 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for a presentence investigation
and report to the court prior to the imposition of sentence. The factors which are con-
sidered in imposing sentence or other correctional treatment are: the defendant's prior
criminal record, personal characteristics, and financial condition in addition to any other
circumstances affecting his behavior which may aid the court. FED. R. CRIm. P. 32 (c).
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may still receive a harsher penalty for that same offense if reconvicted&7
The majority recognized a "chilling effect" upon a convict who hes-
itates to assert his constitutional rights lest he be exposed to a punish-
ment greater than that originally imposed. The solution proffered
requires that the imposition of a greater penalty be supported by the
affirmative findings upon which it is predicated; the premise being that
the reasons will be valid, or if not, will be declared void upon appeal.
Nevertheless, could not a vindictive court, motivated by a defendant's
success, retaliate with a more severe sentence, cloaking a malicious will
in the guise of affirmative rationality? Or conversely, could not a court,
imposing a greater sentence for the welfare of both the criminal and
society, be wrongfully accused of malignant motives?38 It is often im-
possible to determine with accuracy the true forces which manifest
themselves in the greater sentence. A prohibition against all increased
sentences seems to be the sole guarantee against allegations of improper
motivation. This rule currently exists in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,89 and has been proposed in ABA Standards, Post Conviction
Remedies40 and ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Proce-
dures .41
Despite this decision, the "chilling effect" subsists; the accused must
choose between asserting his right to a fair trial, and thereby risking a
harsher penalty, or accepting the court's error, grave as it might be. This
dilemma is illustrated in Fay v. Noia,42 where the Court depicted the
defendant as having
87 See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 25.
s8 See Brief for Respondent at 29-31, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
89 10 U.S.C. § 863(b) (1964).
40 ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO POST CONVICTION REMEDIES § 6.3 (tent.
draft Jan., 1967).
41 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUar STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3.8 (tent. draft Dec.,
1967). See generally Brief for Respondent at 29-31, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969).
42 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The issue here was whether the defendant could be granted
federal habeas corpus relief when he had been denied state post-conviction relief for
failure to institute a direct appeal within the statutory period. The state contended that
the defendant had deliberately avoided state court remedies, in order to avail himself
of a federal writ of habeas corpus. The Court stated, however, that his actions could not
be viewed in this manner. The surrounding circumstances were such as to create the
impression in the defendant's mind that if he was reconvicted, the risk of being sentenced
to death was a distinct probability.
The trial judge, not bound to accept the jury's recommendation of a life
sentence, had said when sentencing him, "I have thought seriously about re-
jecting the recommendation of the jury in your case, Noia, because I feel that if
the jury knew who you were and what you were and your background as a
robber, they would not have made a recommendation. But you have got a good
lawyer, that is my wife. The last thing she told me this morning is to give you
a chance."
Record ff. 2261-62, 372 U.S. at 396-97 n.3. Such a statement on the part of the sentencing
judge would surely impede the defendant in the assertion of his right to appeal in
1969]
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the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprisonment or
to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might
well have led to a retrial and death sentence.43
This deterring effect upon convicts cannot be rationalized in light of
the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.44
As the doctrine of implied acquittal would seem to recognize, the
double jeopardy guarantee is, in fact, violated when a harsher sentence
is imposed.45 The double jeopardy clause having been applied to the
states, state courts, as have the federal courts, 46 should be restrained
from imposing a harsher penalty on reconviction.4 7 There exists no con-
stitutionally significant distinction between the penalty prohibited by
Ex parte Lange48 and United States v. Benz49 and increased punishment
upon retrial. The substantive nature of the evil is not predicated upon
whether the error was committed at trial or during the sentencing
process.5 0 The double jeopardy clause prevents the state, following con-
vindication of the constitutional guarantees against a coerced confession. This situation
graphically demonstrates the "chilling effect" which exists when a defendant might be
penalized more harshly at a second trial. In Pearce, the defendant's fears were realized
when the judge, after reconviction, imposed just such a longer sentence; this may well
serve to restrain others in a similar position from asserting their right to appeal.
On voiding unconstitutional conditions on the right to a fair trial, see Comment,
Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. Rv. 144 (1968).
43 372 U.S. at 440.
44 See generally Agata, supra note 31.
45 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 408 (1963), wherein Mr. Justice Brennan discussed
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873):
The Court held this double-sentencing procedure unconstitutional, on the ground
of double jeopardy, and while conceding that the Circuit Court had a general
competence in criminal cases, reasoned that it had no jurisdiction to render a
patently lawless judgment.
46 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), rendered on the same day as Pearce.
See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 265-66 (1966). As the Court noted
in Pearce:
[ihat guarantee has been said to consist of three constitutional protections. It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.
895 U.S. at 717.
47 United States v. Benz, 282 US. 304 (1931) (dictum noting that an increase in
sentence would have the effect of multiple punishment and thus be violative of the double
jeopardy guarantee); Ex parte Lange, 85 US. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (prohibiting multiple
punishments). It is almost universally held that once a defendant has commenced serving
his sentence, that penalty may not be increased unless the conviction or sentence is vacated.
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir.
1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Walker,
346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965); Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964); Black-
man v. United States, 250 F. 449 (5th Cir. 1918). For an exception to this rule see
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), in which the increase was allowed on the basis
of new information as to the defendant's past criminal record.
48 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
49282 U.S. 304 (1931).
50 Brief for Respondent at 25-26, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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viction, from retrying the defendant in the hope of exacting a
more severe penalty, regardless of evidence subsequently adduced.5'
There is no valid reason for permitting such a practice when a de-
fendant attempts to gain the benefit of an error-free trial. 2 The Court,
by its refusal to extend the double jeopardy clause to second sentences,
provided the states with an opportunity to obtain an increased sentence
due to its own error at the original trial. To the contrary, a state should
be required to stand on its performance at the original trial, as jeopardy
attaches at that point. Moreover, the permission granted to the states to
use after-acquired information in determining the second sentence is
patently unjust. For example, if the defendant has been guilty of mis-
conduct in prison, he may very well receive a longer sentence at retrial.
In reality, then, such punishment would be based upon an official
prison report rather than upon a verdict rendered by a jury composed
of his peers. In addition, although a state cannot retry a man after
acquittal, despite the discovery of new evidence, if a defendant success-
fully asserts his rights, it may employ newly disclosed evidence in an
effort to procure a harsher penalty. It does not follow logically that the
state should be allowed to utilize and derive a benefit from its own
error.
The equal protection problem survives despite this decision. Those
convicts who seek a fair trial are exposed to the risk of a harsher
penalty - a risk avoided by one convicted at an error-free trial. We are
offered no reason as to why one group should be so jeopardized. Only
where error is established at the initial trial is the convict confronted
with the prospect of a second trial at which he must risk the imposition
of a harsher penalty. Such a state of affairs seems to be contrary to the
equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.5 3
The state of the law thus remains, with the minor variation that a
court's discretion in enlarging punishment upon reconviction of a
convict for the same offense may be employed only when it can affirma-
tively demonstrate reasons for such action. Although credit now must
effectively be given for time already served, this generally has been
done, and, in any event, sentences may still be lengthened to compen-
sate for any credit given. It appears inevitable that the Court will
gravitate towards the view that the penalty determined at the original
trial must serve as a ceiling for any penalty subsequently imposed; but
5l Id.
62 S95 U.S. at 786-37 (concurring opinion by Douglas, J.).
53 See generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 595 U.S. 711, 726 (concurring opinion by
Douglas, J.); Van Alstyne, supra note 25.
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unfortunately not in a climate unfavorable to such a continued evolu-
tion in our criminal law. The incompatibility of this decision with the
equal protection clause, the due process clause, and the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution is obvious, and awaits the greater influence of
a more enlightened philosophy of criminal justice.
TAXATION - PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS - IRS RECOGNIZES
CORPORATE STATUS. - Technical Information Release No. 1019, 2
CCH Corporation Law Guide 11;482 (August 19, 1969).
Although courts have attempted to define corporate status since
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,' the issue seems to have
arisen in a tax context only since the passage of the Revenue Act of
1894.2 Subsequently, Congress sought to provide legislative guidelines
for the determination of corporate status for federal tax purposes.3
Unfortunately, however, each of these attempts proved unsuccessful;
the meaning of the term "corporation" remained uncertain. More
importantly, the relationship between state incorporation statutes and
corporate status under federal income tax legislation was never ex-
plored. Nevertheless, there seemed to be little difficulty in the tax treat-
ment of corporations designated as such.
1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), wherein Chief Justice John Marshall defined a
corporation as follows:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or
as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated
to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by
which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and
may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own
affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous
and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it
from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in
succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented,
and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable
of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being.
Id. at 636.
2 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 849, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. While exempting partnerships,
this Act treated corporations and associations alike by imposing a 2 percent tax on
their income. The legislative history preceding passage of this Act indicates a distinction
between corporations and associations on the one hand, and partnerships on the other.
26 CoNe. REc. 6866, 6867 (1894) (remarks of Mr. Hoar). Furthermore, the debates reveal
some sentiment for treating associations organized under state law as "quasi-corporations."
Id. at 6838 (remarks of Mr. Vest).
3 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057. The congressional debates
preceding the passage of the Act indicate that the term "corporation" included asso-
ciations, which were defined as a number of people associated together whether or not
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